Supplemental Environmental Projects’ Wild Ride is a Call for Legislative Action to Protect a Valuable Negotiation Tool by Smith, Joel
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2021 Issue 2 Article 11 
2021 
Supplemental Environmental Projects’ Wild Ride is a Call for 
Legislative Action to Protect a Valuable Negotiation Tool 
Joel Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joel Smith, Supplemental Environmental Projects’ Wild Ride is a Call for Legislative Action to Protect a 
Valuable Negotiation Tool, 2021 J. Disp. Resol. (2021) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2021/iss2/11 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized 
editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Supplemental Environmental
ProjectsmWild Ride is a Call for




In March 2020, the head of the Department of Justice’s Environmental Natural
Resources Division (èDOJ ENRDæ) issued a decision that fundamentally altered
the federal government’s ability to address environmental harm. The decision re-
moved a valuable tool from the negotiation toolbox that Department of Justice
(èDOJæ) attorneys used for decades when negotiating settlements in civil enforce-
ment of federal environmental protection laws. This policy change had the potential
to significantly impact resolution of complex environmental disputes. In February
2021, the new Chief of the DOJ ENRD rescinded the 2020 memo in response to an
executive order from newly elected President Joe Biden. While the rescinding of
the 2020 memo does restore the pre-2020 status quo, both actions show the power
that executive leadership has to unilaterally alter the course of environmental dis-
pute resolution. The tool the 2020 memo prohibited is called a Supplemental En-
vironmental Project (èSEPæ).
As an illustration of the use of SEPs in negotiation, imagine a Missouri corpo-
ration that produced horse saddles and other leather goods. One part of the com-
pany’s process required tanning leather and the tanning process produced
wastewater that contained chemicals that are known to harm the reproductive sys-
tems of various fish species. In an effort to remain competitive, the company failed
to upgrade the technology it used to filter its wastewater before the water was re-
turned to the local municipal water system. As a result, over several years the
amount of contaminant that passed into the local system exceeded the standards set
by the Environmental Protection Agency (èEPAæ). Thus, the city incurred substan-
tial costs to remove the contaminants at its water treatment plant and passed the
costs on to taxpayers. Additionally, the wastewater treatment plant was not de-
signed for such contaminants and, despite the additional expenditures, some of the
contaminants made their way into a local river. Over years, local children who
played in the river were exposed to the chemicals and a population of a protected
trout species had far lower than average reproduction rates.
After being alerted by the local college, the EPA notified the company of its
violation. Due to the magnitude of the harm caused and the recklessness that the
EPA perceived, the EPA requested the DOJ to file a civil action against the
* B.S., University of Missouri, 2009; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; As-
sociate Member, Missouri Journal of Dispute Resolution, 2020-2021. I am most grateful to Professor
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company. Company representatives met with the EPA over several weeks and it
became apparent that the EPA intended to pursue $1.5 million in civil penalties.
However, the EPA indicated that the penalty could be lowered if the company were
to undergo voluntary projects to address the harm it caused. While the company
was fairly confident it would be difficult for the EPA to prove that the company’s
contaminants caused the harm to the fish population, it was wary of the impact pub-
lic exposure would have on its business. The company decided it would be more
beneficial to help the fish species than challenge the EPA and DOJ in court. The
DOJ attorneys agreed to allow the company to fund a fishery project at the local
college that bred the fish species in captivity and released the young to the local
river in exchange for a $1 million reduction in the civil penalties. Because the EPA
and DOJ knew they would not be able obtain a court order to fund the college pro-
ject and the company knew its image would be partially restored by aiding a famous
local fish species, the decision to engage in the project was seen as a win-win.
SEPs are defined as èenvironmentally beneficial projects which a defendant
agrees to undertake in the settlement of an enforcement action, but which the de-
fendant, or any other third party, is not otherwise legally required to perform.æ1 The
voluntary nature of these projects is an important aspect because they often address
harm that is not directly attributable to the defendant’s actions.2 However, the pro-
jects are geared towards addressing the harm associated with the defendant’s viola-
tions. Loosening the requirement for a strict causal link permits the projects to be
more expansive than that which a court could order.
This Note examines how the use of SEPs has evolved to improve the resolution
of environmental disputes, how challenges to the use of SEPs has intensified in
recent years, and how continued use could be appropriately maintained. Part II of
this note discusses how SEPs have developed. Next, Part III discusses the problems
inherent in SEPs and the various challenges critics have made. Lastly, Part IV con-
cludes by arguing that SEPs are well suited to handle the unique nature of environ-
mental problems, asserting that the value SEPs provide to negotiation of environ-
mental disputes warrants a permanent solution so as to avoid a future prohibition
by the executive branch and proposes solutions to address the problems SEPs pre-
sent, thus making a legislative solution possible.
II. HOW SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTSHAVE
DEVELOPED
The EPA developed its use of SEPs over the last four decades and has made
several policy changes that have resulted in a more sophisticated approach. The
Clean Air Act has been one of the most consequential pieces of legislation for the
EPA.3 Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that the EPA’s use of SEP like initiatives
1. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,856–
62 (May 10, 1995).
2. SeeUnited States v. Glob. Partners LP, No. 2:19-CV-122-DBH, 2019 WL 6954274, at *7 (D. Me.
Dec. 19, 2019) (approving an SEP that the court acknowledged did not address the actual harm caused
by the violation that was the subject of the action).
3. For an example of the prominent role of the Clean Air Act in the EPA’s world, between 1995 and
2010, 59% of cases filed against the EPA were a result of the Clean Air Act. Courtney R. McVean &
Justin R. Pidot, Environmental Settlements and Administrative Law, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 197
(2015).
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began with Clean Air Act violations in the 1980s4 and underwent significant revi-
sions in the 1990s.
A. EPA Policy Development
In 1991, the EPA issued its first formal policy on agency-wide use of SEPs.5
This policy replaced three pages of guidance contained in a 1984 General Enforce-
ment Policy that explained when the EPA could reduce civil penalties in exchange
for èalternative paymentsæ with ten pages of considerable detail on the same topic.6
Among the details were the official use of the term èSupplemental Environmental
Projectsæ in place of èAlternative Payments,æ five categories of projects which the
Agency would consider as SEPs, and a number of specific examples of supple-
mental projects.7
In 1995, the EPA issued an interim policy that superseded the 1991 policy.8
The interim policy stated that its purpose was èto provide greater flexibility to [the]
EPA in exercising its enforcement discretion to establish appropriate settlement
penalties and to the regulated community in proposing SEPs designed to secure
significant environmental or public health protection and improvements.æ9 The pol-
icy included five broad legal guidelines that must be followed when crafting an
SEP: (1) there must be a èsufficient nexus . . . between the violation and the pro-
posed project[;]æ (2) the project èmust advance at least one of the objectives of the
environmental statutes that are the basis of the action[;]æ (3) èthe EPA may not play
any role in managing or controlling fundsæ related to the SEP; (4) èSEPs may not
be agreements to spend a certain amount on a project that will be defined later. . . .
[T]he type and scope of each project must be specifically described and defined[;]æ
and (5) the èproject may not be used to satisfy the EPA’s statutory obligation . . . to
perform a particular activity.æ10 The policy provided a non-exhaustive list of
4. Seema Kakade, Remedial Payments in Agency Enforcement, 44 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 129
(2020) (èThe origins of payment for projects in environmental enforcement arose in the 1980s with the
issuance of EPA’s CAA and Clean Water Act (èCWAæ) penalty policy.æ).
5. James M. Strock, Policy On The Use Of Supplemental Enforcement Projects In EPA Settlements,
OSWER 9832.20-1A (1991), 1991 WL 11255441.
6. See U.S. EPA, EC-P-1998-142, A Framework for Statute-Specific Approaches to Penalty Assess-
ments: Implementing EPA’s Policy on Civil Penalties 24–27 (1998), https://www.epa.gov/sites/produc-
tion/files/documents/penasm-civpen-mem.pdf; James M. Strock, Policy On The Use Of Supplemental
Enforcement Projects In EPA Settlements, OSWER 9832.20-1A (1991), 1991 WL 11255441.
7. James M. Strock, Policy On The Use Of Supplemental Enforcement Projects In EPA Settlements,
OSWER 9832.20-1A (1991), 1991 WL 11255441.
8. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,856–
62 (May 10, 1995). See also Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. EPA, to
Regional Adm’rs, Issuance of the Interim Revised Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy (May 3,
1995), https://bit.ly/3e8ShvI (explaining that the policy was being issued èin an interim version because
we may wish to revise it based on public comments and our experience in using it. We are using it as an
interim policy, rather than as a draft, because we believe it is superior to the 1991 Policy and thus should
go into effect as soon as possible.æ).
9. Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,856–
62 (May 10, 1995).
10. Id. at 24,858.
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examples of unacceptable projects.11 It also set forth a list of factors12 that would
increase the value of SEPs and ultimately reduce the assessed civil penalty.13 Re-
duction of a civil penalty was capped at eighty percent, but in special circumstances
the penalty could be eliminated entirely for certain small entities or if the project
produced pollution prevention.14
In 1998, the EPA supplemented the 1995 policy15 and included notable addi-
tions like increased detail regarding penalty reduction calculations.16 In addition to
the general factors contained in the 1995 policy, the supplement provided specific
steps on how to apply the factors and arrive at a final figure.17
In 2015, the EPA released its most recent SEP policy.18 The memo accompa-
nying the 2015 policy update stated that the purpose of the release was to èenable
case teams to more efficiently and effectively include SEPs in settlement of civil
enforcement cases.æ19 The update made explicit that one of the agency’s priorities
when considering SEPs was climate change.20
B. The Process
The EPA’s typical process for enforcement of Clean Air Act violations pro-
vides a good example of the general process it follows in all enforcement actions.
To start, a statutorily permitted inspection typically prompts an investigation of a
regulated party’s facility.21 Next, the EPA collects information by conducting fa-
cility inspections or using other data collection methods.22 If a violation is found,
11. Id. at 24,860. (èA. General public educational or public environmental awareness projects (e.g.,
sponsoring public seminars, conducting tours of environmental controls at a facility, or promoting recy-
cling in a community); B. Contributions to environmental research at a college or university; C. Cash
donations to community groups, environmental organizations, state/local/federal entities, or any other
third party; D. Projects for which the defendant does not retain full responsibility to ensure satisfactory
completion; E. Projects which, though beneficial to a community, are unrelated to environmental pro-
tection (e.g., making a contribution to a non-profit, public interest, environmental or other charitable
organization, donating playground equipment, etc.); F. Studies or assessments without a requirement to
address the problems identified in the study (except as provided for in Section V.E above); G. Projects
which the defendant, SEP recipient, or SEP implementer will undertake, in whole or in part, with federal
loans, federal contracts, federal grants, or other forms of federal financial assistance or non-financial
assistance; H. Projects that are expected to become profitable to the defendant within the first five years
of implementation (within the first three years for SEPs implemented by defendants that are small busi-
nesses or small communities)[.]æ).
12. These factors include Benefits to the public or environment at large; Innovativeness; Environmen-
tal Justice, Multimedia Impacts, Pollution Prevention. Id. at 24,861.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796–24,804 (May
5, 1998).
16. Id. at 24,804.
17. Id. at 24,802-04.
18. Memorandum from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement and Compliance As-
surance, U.S. EPA, to Reg’l Adm’rs, Issuance of the 2015 Update to the 1998 U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy (Mar. 10, 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/sepupdatedpolicy15.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5.
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the EPA will typically issue a Notice of Violation,23 which is required by statute.24
Finally, a complaint is filed with the court, which allows for formal discovery to
further determine the extent of the violation.25 It is at this point that settlement ne-
gotiations between the parties might introduce the prospect of a SEP.
Settlement agreements between violators and the DOJ are enforced under con-
sent decrees. A consent decree can be understood as a settlement agreement subject
to continued judicial policing.26 Once the parties reach a settlement agreement, the
proposed agreement is provided to the public for comment.27 After the comment
period, the parties motion a court to enter a consent decree to enforce the settle-
ment.28 When reviewing the motion, the court assesses the substantive fairness of
the agreement by determining if it is adequate, reasonable, and appropriate.29 Part
of that determination involves assessing if the agreement is confined to the dispute
between the parties.30
C. States and SEPs
In addition to the federal government, states also have a history of using SEPs
to resolve environmental enforcement actions. A 2005 study revealed that forty-
seven states made use of SEPs in some form.31 While some states closely mirrored
the EPA’s policy for restrictions designed to limit inappropriate use, others deviated
by allowing the enforcement agency to propose a project instead of requiring the
violator to develop the idea.32 The study also revealed a method in use at the state
level that was more novel than the federal method. States often used databases that
allowed any party to present the proposal, known as èSEP Idea Banks.æ33 Idea
Banks addressed the policy concern that an agency might directs funds to its pet
projects.34 Idea Banks are repositories of project proposals that violators can choose
from during settlement negotiations in enforcement actions.35 While some of the
ideas were submitted by local government agencies, many came from non-govern-
mental organizations.36 At the time of the study, Maine, Delaware, and Illinois had
SEP Idea Banks.37 The Illinois system for soliciting ideas was designed to ensure
any project that made it to the list had the support of the local community.38 The




26. United States v. State of Or., 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1990).
27. Kakade, supra note 22, at 127; see also Proposed Consent Decrees, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/enrd/consent-decrees (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
28. Kakade, supra note 22, at 127.
29. Id.; see also United States v. Glob. Partners LP, No. 2:10-CV-122-DBH, 2019 WL 6954274 at
*s5 (D. Me. Dec. 19, 2019).
30. United States v. Glob. Partners LP, 2019 WL 6954274, at *5.
31. Steven Bonorris & Chelsea Holloway, Annie Lo, Grace Yang, Environmental Enforcement in the
Fifty States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 11 HASTINGSW.-NW.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 210 (2005).





37. Bonorris et al., supra note 32, at 214.
38. Id.
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projects actually redound to the benefit of local communitiesæ and (2) èthey reduce
transaction costs for all parties.æ39 Another way that states deviate from the federal
policy is that they allocate funds collected from civil penalties for use in SEP like
projects.40 A Delaware statute allowed twenty-five percent of penalties to be used
to address degradation in the community associated with the violation the penalty
resulted from.41
III. CHALLENGES TOUSE OF SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROJECTS
Despite their seeming popularity, SEPs have been challenged on multiple
grounds. The political aspect of how the federal government and the public view
environmental concerns has caused challenges to come from the conservative side
of the political aisle.42 However, the partisan nature of the dispute over SEPs does
not eliminate the substance of the challenges that opponents have made.
A. Comptroller of the Currency
The primary legal challenge to SEPs has been made on statutory grounds. In
December 1991, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions requested the Comptroller of the Currency provide an opinion on the validity
of the EPA’s use of SEPs when settling disputes arising from Clean Air Act viola-
tions.43 At the time, the EPA claimed that the authority Congress had granted the
EPA to ècompromise, or remit, with or without conditionsæ civil penalties assessed
under a particular section of the Clean Air Act permitted SEPs.44 Additionally, the
EPA stated that its policy furthered Congress’s goal when passing the Clean Air
Act.45 The Comptroller unequivocally rejected the EPA’s justifications as inade-
quate and stated that the statutes providing the EPA with the authority to assess
fines did not permit SEP activity.46 Specifically, the EPA and Comptroller took
different views on whether a Senate report indicated that the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendment had ratified the process the EPA had been using.47 In 1993, the Chair-
man again asked the Comptroller to provide an opinion on the EPA’s use of SEPs.48
This request came in response to the EPA continuing to claim that the practice was
valid and indicating that the Comptroller’s findings would have been different had
39. Id.
40. Id. at 215.
41. Id.
42. Joshua Ozymy, Bryan Menard, & Melissa L. Jarrell, Persistence or Partisanship: Exploring the
Relationship Between Presidential Administrations and Criminal Enforcement by the US Environmental
Protection Agency, 1983-2019, 81 PAR 49, 49-63 (2020) (listing examples of how which political party
is associated with Presidents has impacted the EPA).




47. Id. èThe Administrator may continue to issue . . . [Notices of Violation] to alleged violators of
Title II provisions and to settle such matters to the extent authorized by law . . .æ (quoting S. REP. NO.
228-101, at 125-26 (1989)).
48. The Honorable John D. Dingell Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations Comm. on
Energy & Com. House of Representatives, B-247155 (Mar. 1, 1993)
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the Comptroller considered the EPA’s written SEP policy.49 The Comptroller stated
that the EPA’s policy had been reviewed and reiterated its earlier opinion.50 The
Comptroller’s opinions had little effect on the EPA’s behavior—possibly because
the EPA gave weight to the Supreme Court’s skeptical view of the Comptroller’s
authority over executive agencies.51
B. Courts
Due to the requirement that settlements in DOJ ENRD enforcement actions be
enforced under consent decrees, federal courts have had frequent opportunities to
weigh in on the use of SEPs. While this Note focuses on SEPs resulting from ne-
gotiated settlements, it is helpful to discuss how courts have enforced projects in
judgment orders as well as consent decrees. When discussing how the courts have
reacted to settlements involving SEPs, it is important to distinguish between citizen
suits and actions brought by the government. A citizen suit is a private action
brought by a non-government plaintiff who claims that the defendant has violated
a federal environmental protection law.52 Many environmental statutes specifically
authorize citizen suits against private violators and the government.53 In both citi-
zen suits and actions where the government is the plaintiff, courts have been clear
that if a payment made by a violator is labeled as a penalty then it must go to the
U.S. Treasury.54
In 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Pub.
Interest Research Grp. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., a cit-
izen suit where the lower court ordered that the funds from the civil penalty be paid
into a trust fund that would be used to improve the environment in the community
where the violations occurred.55 The lower court’s decision was based on the con-
clusion that depositing the funds into the U.S. Treasury would not serve the purpose
of the Clean Air Act but that the trust fund would because the fund would be used
directly in the affected community.56 The Third Circuit acknowledged that it is
within a court’s power to order a remedial fund in the nature of a trust, but that once
a remedy has been labeled as a penalty it is not appropriate for a court to do so.57
Furthermore, the Third Circuit’s decision emphasized such a fund could only be
used to address harm that has an adequate nexus with the violator’s conduct.58 As
49. Id. (EPA had questioned whether the Comptroller reviewed the EPA’s policy when formulating
his 1992 opinion).
50. Id.
51. Edward Lloyd, Supplemental Environmental Projects Have Been Effectively Used in Citizen Suits
to Deter Future Violations As Well As to Achieve Significant Additional Environmental Benefits, 10
WIDENER L. REV. 413, 430 (2004).
52. Id.
53. A non-exhaustive list includes the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the ESA, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act. McVean & Pidot, supra note 4, at 197.
54. Lloyd, supra note 52 at 418; Sierra Club, Inc. v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1354
(9th Cir. 1990).
55. Pub. Int Rsch Grp. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.
1990).
56. Id. at 81.
57. Id. at 82.
58. Id.
7
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a result of the remedy having been labeled as a civil penalty, the Third Circuit re-
versed the portion of the order creating the trust fund.59
In 1991, in United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana addressed the question of whether non-penalty
remedies were available to a government plaintiff when a judgment was issued.60
The court determined that it was a question of first impression.61 In Roll Coater,
the defendant was found to have discharged effluents into municipal waters in vio-
lation of the Clean Water Act.62 Although no actual damage was shown, violation
of the Clean Water Act creates strict liability and the EPA sought civil enforce-
ment.63 The defendant requested that the court use its equitable jurisdiction to order
diversion of a portion of the assessed penalty to a specific research project, as well
as to fund the state’s Center for Environmental Responsibility to House the Pollu-
tion Prevention Institute.64 The EPA argued that the assessed penalty must be de-
posited into the U.S. Treasury,65 which the EPA contended was in line with the
agency’s historical and current view that SEPs are not civil penalties.66 Citing prec-
edent,67 the court acknowledged that it had the power to order such remedies—
although it was not required to decide if it was appropriate in this case because the
parties agreed to dismiss the injunctive relief claim.68
Courts have acknowledged that silence in an environmental statute as to how
penalties are allocated requires adherence to the Miscellaneous Receipt Act’s
(èMRAæ) requirement that such funds be deposited into the U.S. Treasury.69 In
addition, courts have determined that SEPs are an appropriate resolution in settle-
ments enforced under consent decrees even if the court would not be able to order
such relief.70 Congress has also taken the opportunity to address SEP use.
59. Id.
60. No. IP 89-828C, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8790, at *30 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 1991)
61. Id. at *27. (èThe issue of whether other remedies are available when the United States brings the
action and judgment is rendered is a question of first impression.æ).
62. Id. at *1.
63. Id. at *5, *10.
64. Id. at *29.
65. Id. at *30.
66. See infra section II A.
67. Pub. Interest Research Grp. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64,
81 (3d Cir. 1990).
68. United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 21073, 21077–78, 1991 WL 165771 (S.D.
Ind. 1991).
69. United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 373, 374 (E.D. Va. 1997).
70. Bonorris et al., supra note 32, at 198-99. (è[I]n Local No. 93, International Association of Fire-
fighters v. City of Cleveland, the Supreme Court has held that a court may approve a consent decree
containing relief that the court itself could not grant after a trial. The Court held that it was unnecessary
to examine the precise limits of the underlying statute, because its limits äare not implicated by voluntary
agreements.’ However, some provisos remain: the consent decree must itself be legal, within the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, within the general scope of the complaint, and must further the objectives of
the law upon which the complaint was based. Thus, the Court shifted the inquiry away from the issue of
the general legality of SEPs to whether a specific SEP is consistent with and enjoys a nexus to the un-
derlying environmental statute. That these conditions so closely track the core elements of EPA’s current
SEP Policy is a significant convergence of legal doctrines.æ).
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C. Legislature
A significant legislative attempt to curtail the use of SEPs, the Stop Settlement
Slush Funds Act,71 came not in response to SEPs directly, but to similar settlements
between the DOJ and financial institutions in the wake of the late 2000s financial
crisis.72 However, a House report connected to the Clean Air Act that directly dis-
cussed SEPs73 specifically highlighted the Volkswagen settlement.74 The
Volkswagen settlement was connected to its widely publicized Clean Air Act vio-
lations that required the company to contribute to an electric car initiative.75 The
Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act bill arose in Congress in 2016.76 Little action
occurred before the Presidential election out of fear that President Obama would
veto the bill. That changed after the election of President Trump, at which point the
Republican-controlled House quickly passed the bill.77 The bill prohibited govern-
ment officials from entering into settlement agreements that directed payments to
third parties, except in cases where the payment was for restitution or to directly
remedy harm caused by the party making the payment.78 However, the Senate never
took the bill up for consideration.79 After Congress’s failure to enact SEP change,
the next attack on SEPs came from the executive branch.
D. Department of Justice
The Trump Administration’s DOJ took several steps to curtail SEP use. In June
2017, Attorney General (èAGæ) Jeff Sessions issued a memo addressing the DOJ’s
use of payments to third parties in settlement agreements.80 The memo immediately
prohibited such payments in general, although it permitted an exception for other-
wise lawful payments that would provide restitution to a victim or directly remedy
the relevant harm.81 The memo specifically provided harm to the environment as
an example of èrelevant harm.æ82
Seven months later, in January 2018, the Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Jeffrey Woods, issued a memo clarifying and expanding upon AG Sessions’ memo
as it related to settlement agreements entered into specifically by the DOJ ENRD.83
71. Thomas O. McGarity, Supplemental Environmental Projects in Complex Environmental Litiga-
tion, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1412 (2020).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 5.
74. See generally In re: Volkswagen èClean DieselæMktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
2672 CRB (JSC), 2016 WL 4010049 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2016).
75. èDOJ’s 2016 settlement with Volkswagen required the company to spend $2 billion on an Admin-
istration electric vehicle initiative after Congress twice refused to pay for it.æ H.R. REP. 115-72 at 3.
76. McGarity, supra note 72 at 1412.
77. Id.
78. H.R. REP. 115-72 at 3.
79. United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. Va. 1997).
80. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys,
Prohibition on Settlement Payments to Third Parties (June 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/4MS6-AHYK.
81. Id.
82. Id. (èFirst, the policy does not apply to an otherwise lawful payment or loan that provides restitu-
tion to a victim or that otherwise directly remedies the harm that is sought to be redressed, including, for
example, harm to the environment or from official corruption.æ).
83. Memorandum from Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to ENRD Deputy Assistant
Att’ys Gen. and Section Chiefs, Settlement Payments to Third Parties in ENRD Cases (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://perma.cc/4PLY-S5L6.
9
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The memo provided several examples of third-party payments that would not be
prohibited–focusing on how closely each payment was related to the harm to be
redressed.84 One illuminative example related to wildlife trafficking.85 The memo
stated that payments related to remedying harm caused to a species of protected
animal should ideally be constrained to the specific population that was affected by
the harm and not simply the species in general.86 The memo explained that the use
of an SEP was not prohibited so long as it complied with the EPA’s policy, and
implied that the reasoning was because the EPA’s policy already prohibited pay-
ments to third parties.87 The memo stated explicitly that any payments to third par-
ties must comply with the MRA and Anti-Deficiency Act (èADAæ).88
In August 2019, the Assistant Attorney General (èAAGæ), Jeffrey Clark, issued
a memo specific to the use of SEPs to address violations involving local and state
governments.89 AAG Clark stated that his interpretation of the 2018 memo was that
a goal of the policy was to avoid impacting how local governments navigated po-
litical constraints when pursuing environmental goals.90 Specifically, Clark posited
that local governments found to be violators would use consent decrees that in-
cluded SEPs to fund projects the government would otherwise be unable to fund
without first obtaining public approval.91 However, the memo outlined a possible
exception if a government defendant certified that the SEP was not being used to
avoid a local restriction.92 The memo further stated that one of the AG’s statements
in his 2018 memo93 directly prohibited the use of SEPs.94 AAG Clark indicated that
the AG’s statement specifically addressed SEPs because the EPA’s 2015 SEP pol-
icy explicitly stated SEPs are designed to provide relief beyond that which could be
obtained at law.95
In March 2020, AAG Clark again issued a memo further restricting the use of
SEPs.96 The memo removed any exceptions for the use of SEPs in consent decrees
or settlements with local governments and completely prohibited the use of SEPs
outside those related to a specific Clean Air Act provision.97 Moreover, Clark
84. Id.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id. (èIn a wildlife trafficking case, a third-party payment to directly remedy harm must focus on
protection and recovery for the affected species, preferably the affected population of that species where
possible.æ).
87. Id. at 8.
88. Id.
89. Memorandum from Jeffrey Bossert Clark, U.S. Assistant Att’y Gen., to Chiefs of All Remaining
ENRD Sections, Using Supplemental Environmental Projects (èSEPsæ) in Settlements with State and
Local Governments 8 (Aug. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/XS3U-9BN6.
90. Id. (è[A] related goal of the policy was to avoid encouraging state and local governments to use
federal consent decrees to circumvent any legal constraints they may face when they engage in new
undertakings, such as the need to pass new legislation, issue new municipal ordinances, or obtain requi-
site funding.æ).
91. Id. at 12. (èIf state or local officials want certain projects undertaken in their communities, they
should seek authorization through local democratic processes rather than by acquiescing in a consent
decree with a federal agency that is supervised by a federal court.æ)
92. Id. at 13.
93. Id. at 8. (Attorney General Sessions provided that consent decrees could not be used to èextract
greater or different relief from the defendant than could be obtained through agency enforcement author-
ity or by litigating the matter to judgment.æ).
94. Id.
95. Clark, supra note 90, at 4.
96. Id. at 1, 16.
97. Id. at 18.
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provided a detailed analysis of the legal and policy landscape as he saw it, which
expanded considerably on the earlier DOJ policy change announcements.98 Clark
acknowledged three policy concerns.99 First, the AAG explained that èSEPs could
. . . intrude on state and local accountability, by allowing the Executive Branch to
commit state and local taxpayers to funding projects not otherwise required by their
laws.æ100 Second, SEPs could ègive oversight of these voluntary projects to a fed-
eral court, and subject SEP violations to the contempt power.æ101 Third, SEPs could
èallow state and local officials to commit to projects that are contrary to the express
or implied will of the state or local legislative branches.æ102
The 2020 memo also contained the AAG’s concerns with SEPs from a consti-
tutional perspective. Clark stated that SEPs make the executive branch a èquasi-
appropriatoræ of funds in violation of Taxing and Spending Clause and the Appro-
priations Clause of the Constitution.103 Clark went so far as to evoke the ècenturies
of struggle between the Crown and Parliamentæ as justification for his constitutional
concern.104 While the legislature can delegate its authority to the executive branch,
Clark did not think it had done so.
One of the largest portions of the memo was spent addressing the EPA’s policy
made in response to the historical concerns regarding violations of the MRA and
ADA.105 Clark acknowledged that the EPA had made changes in the previous dec-
ades to reduce èthe probability of the most serious violations of the law.æ106 How-
ever, he characterized the current EPA policy as not addressing the fundamental
issue with SEPs.107 Clark explained that the nexus requirement of the EPA policy,
while correct in spirit, was insufficiently direct to absolve the EPA’s policy from
appropriations issues.108
In February 2021, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jean E. Williams re-
scinded the 2018, 2019, and 2020 Memos.109 Her action came in response to an
executive order that Williams stated had directed agencies to review and take action
to address agency actions that conflicted with certain environmentally focused na-
tional objectives.110 A single sentence contained the full extent of Williams’s anal-
ysis justifying the rescission: èBecause these memoranda are inconsistent with
longstanding Division policy and practice and because they may impede the full
exercise of enforcement discretion in the Division’s cases, I have determined that
withdrawal is appropriate pursuant to Executive Order 13,990.æ111 While
98. Id.
99. Id. at 16.
100. Id.
101. Clark, supra note 90, at 16.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 16-17.
104. Id. at 17.
105. Of the 19 pages, five were spent addressing the most recent EPA SEP policy update from 2015.
Id. at 11-15.
106. Clark, supra note 90, at 12.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 15 (èRelatedly, while EPA’s SEP policy requires SEPs to have a nexus to the underlying
offense, the nexus is necessarily indirect.æ).
109. Memorandum from Jean E. Williams, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to ENRD Section Chiefs and
Deputy Section Chiefs, Withdrawal of Memoranda and Policy Documents (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/page/file/1364716/download
110. Id. See also Executive Order 13,990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring
Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021).
111. Williams, supra note 110.
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Williams’s memo restored SEPs to their place as an available tool for DOJ ENRD
negotiators, it did not address any of the historical criticism and left SEPs open to
future attack.
IV. ANALYSIS
While the Biden Administration has restored the use of SEPs for now, another
policy change, similar to the one made by the DOJ ENRD March 2020 Memo, re-
mains possible and would negatively impact resolution of environmental disputes
in several key aspects. Since litigation is a more costly and time-consuming method
for resolving enforcement of environmental protection laws than negotiated settle-
ments,112 anything that will lead to more litigation will have a negative impact.
SEPs have been shown to be an effective method of addressing the unique chal-
lenges presented in environmental enforcement.113 Without SEPs, settlements
would become more difficult to negotiate and the need for fully litigated solutions,
or at least greater time spent in court before settlement is reached would result.
With more resources spent in resolving each enforcement action, the EPA and DOJ
would be forced to pursue fewer enforcement actions. The disputes would persist,
but resolution would decrease. As a result, efforts should be made to address the
concerns with SEPs and ensure a more stable future.
A. The Nature of Environmental Problems and the Inadequacy of Lit-
igation to Solve Them
Environmental disputes are complex to resolve due to the difficulty in assessing
causality and degree of harm, the breadth of aggrieved interested parties, and the
complex scientific nature of the violation and remedies. Assessing the amount of
harm caused by a violation of an environmental protection statute is inherently dif-
ficult.114 Compounding this, once harm has occurred, the baseline for the pre-vio-
lation status quo is no longer available.115 Also, environmental disputes often in-
volve many parties from multiple organizations.116 Resolution of environmental
conflicts between agencies and those regulated is a continual process.117 Violations
of environmental laws often involve highly technical engineering, chemical, or hy-
drogeologic aspects.118 As such, the practice of environmental law in general is
èentwined with scientific and engineering disciplines.æ119 To effectively resolve
112. See infra section IV A.
113. Id.
114. See generally, Karen Bradshaw, Settling for Natural Resource Damages, 40 HARV. ENV’TL. REV.
211, 244 (2016).
115. Id. (èWithin any single injury, the harmmay also be underestimated because the baseline condition
of the resource prior to injury must be retroactively determined, a scientifically uncertain task.æ)
116. E. David Hoard, USAF, Negotiating with Environmental Regulatory Agencies: Working Towards
Harmony, 31 A.F. L. REV. 201, 201 (1989); Plaintiffs in suits against the EPA between 1995 and 2010
involved trade associations, private companies, local environmental groups and citizens’ groups, and
national environmental groups. McVean & Pidot, supra note 4, at 197.
117. Hoard, supra note 117, at 201.
118. Id. at 201-02.
119. Id. at 201.
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environmental disputes and address the inherent complexity, lawyers must con-
stantly consult with experts in the relevant fields.120
The private parties, agencies, and the courts involved in resolving environmen-
tal disputes have not shown an appetite for fully litigated outcomes. Historically,
the overwhelming majority of civil actions aimed at enforcing environmental pro-
tection statutes that are brought by the DOJ end in settlement.121 Courts have sug-
gested that a bad settlement can be superior to a good trial,122 specifically because
èit promotes the interests of litigants by saving them the expense and uncertainties
of trial, as well as the interests of the judicial system by making it unnecessary to
devote public resources to disputes that the parties themselves can resolve with a
mutually agreeable outcome.æ123 Additionally, settlement affords parties an oppor-
tunity to craft solutions not available to the courts.124 Outside of negotiated solu-
tions, agencies do not typically have authority to affect pollution prevention
measures instituted by companies.125
Companies that violate federal environmental laws largely favor the use of
SEPs in settlement agreements. For example, one survey of violators whose settle-
ments included SEPs found that nine out of ten supported use of SEPs.126 AAG
Jeffrey Clark himself admitted the popularity of SEPs in his order to eliminate
them.127 One of the clear benefits to violators in crafting a settlement involving a
SEP is obtaining goodwill with the community that would not be achieved with a
large penalty.128 Since individuals associated with the violating entity typically re-
side in the communities near the entity, they benefit directly from SEPs as members
of the community.129 SEPs also allow violators to avoid facing the ècold realityæ of
large monetary penalties.130
The potential for environmental disputes is increasing. Experts across the
world say that environmental problems will only become more prevalent in the
120. Id. at 202.
121. èRoughly ninety percent of firms cited with noncriminal violations of federal environmental stat-
utes in the United States resolve the matter through a negotiated settlement (rather than through an ad-
ministrative hearing or court trial).æ Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation As A Means
of Developing and Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 HARV.
ENV’TL. REV. 141, 188 (1999); John C. Cruden, Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforce-
ment: Process, Actors, and Trends, Nat. Res. & Env’t, Spring 2004, at 10, 15.
122. McVean & Pidot, supra note 4, at 206.
123. Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Vill. of Addison, Ill., 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1149 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
124. John C. Cruden, Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement: Process, Actors, and
Trends, NAT. RESOURCES&ENV’T, Spring 2004, at 10, 15; Edward Lloyd, Supplemental Environmental
Projects Have Been Effectively Used in Citizen Suits to Deter Future Violations As Well As to Achieve
Significant Additional Environmental Benefits, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 413, 416–17 (2004).
125. Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation As A Means of Developing and Imple-
menting Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 188
(1999).
126. Id. at 190-91.
127. Clark, supra note 90, at 16, https://www.justice.gov/enrd/page/file/1257901/download. (èBefore
discussing those concerns, I must acknowledge that the regulated community (both state and local gov-
ernments and businesses alike) and many within the Executive Branch remain fond of SEPs.æ).
128. Caroline D. Makepeace, With A NewUpdate, EPA’s Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy




130. Clark, supra note 90, at 16.
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future—largely due to the effects of climate change.131 The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (èIPCCæ) predicts that temperatures will rise ten degrees
over the next century.132 In recent decades, glaciers have decreased in size expo-
nentially, leading to rising water levels across the world.133 Scientists have con-
cluded that changing temperatures will lead to shifts in animal habitats, more severe
droughts and heat waves, and more dangerous hurricanes. èTaken as a whole,æ the
IPCC states, èthe range of published evidence indicate that net damage costs of
climate change are likely to be significant and to increase over time.æ134
Beyond the dangers of climate change, communities throughout the United
States also face immediate environmental dangers, many of which are detailed in
the EPA’s Report on the Environment.135 In the report, the EPA pinpoints over
eighty indicators of immediate environmental danger including air quality, fresh
water pollution, chemical contamination of land, and the dangers caused by human
exposure to environmental contaminants.136 The Fourth National Climate Assess-
ment, a 1,656-page assessment by thirteen federal agencies published in 2018, goes
even deeper, laying out in detail the grave effects of climate change and pollution.137
These effects not only directly impact the planet, but also people and the economy.
The report states in no uncertain terms that è[o]bservations collected around the
world provide significant, clear, and compelling evidence that global average tem-
perature is much higher, and is rising more rapidly, than anything modern civiliza-
tion has experienced, with widespread and growing impacts.æ138 Because SEPs
benefit the negotiated solutions that all parties prefer and the fact that environmental
difficulties associated with the need for SEPs are on the rise, SEP use must continue.
B. Removing the Threat to SEPs
As the recent prohibition and rescission have shown, executive action can
quickly and easily alter the landscape for SEP use. There is an acknowledged gen-
eral rule that actions cannot bind successors of government actors, so a future pro-
hibition is possible. As a result, executive action simply undoing the actions taken
during the Biden Administration could also be undone in a future administration
131. See, e.g., JERRYM.MELILLO, TERESE (T.C.)RICHMOND,ANDGARYW.YOHE, CLIMATECHANGE
IMPACTS IN THEUNITED STATES: THETHIRDNATIONALCLIMATEASSESSMENT. U.S. GLOBALCHANGE
RESEARCH PROGRAM 841 (2014), doi:10.7930/J0Z31WJ2.; Climate Change: The Need to Act Now:
hearing before the subcommittee on clean air and nuclear safety of the committee of environment and
public works, United States Senate and the Committee and Environmental and Public works, S. Hrg.
113-771, (2014).
132. NASA, GLOBALCLIMATECHANGE, https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/, (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
133. Id.
134. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 17,
(2007), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf.
135. What is the Report on the Environment?, (last visited on Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/re-
port-environment.
136. Id.
137. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II: Impacts,
Risks, and Adaptation in the United States, 2018, https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/down-
loads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf.
138. Id. at 36.
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and would fail to address the legitimate concerns with the practice. For this reason,
any executive action is less desirable than a more permanent, legislative one.
Well-crafted legislation could address the spending and policy challenges to
SEPs. Since the primary legal challenge of using SEPs in settling civil enforcement
actions is the argument that the reduction in penalties is an unpermitted diversion
from the treasury, a statutory action need only acknowledge the ADA and MRA to
resolve those complaints. Congress certainly has the power to delegate discretion-
ary spending decisions to agencies.139 As in Delaware, one potential solution is to
allow a percentage of civil penalties to be allocated specifically for SEP-like spend-
ing.140 Regardless of how specifically designed, any formal delegation from Con-
gress would cure any constitutional and statutory complaints.
Any proposed legislation should clearly address the policy concerns raised by
detractors so as to provide the best chance of success in Congress. Due to the par-
tisan divide on the issue,141 the likelihood of legislation depends on what political
party controls Congress. If the president at the time any such legislation passes is
not friendly to it, then enactment might turn on the ability to override a veto.142
Considering that neither the 114th nor the 115th Congress were able to pass the
Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act,143 there may be considerable barriers to legisla-
tion. Although each major political party has had its turn at controlling both houses
of Congress multiple times since SEP use began, neither has directly prohibited or
approved of SEPs through legislation.144 This indicates there has not been a strong
enough concern that SEPs should not be allowed—the status quo of continued use
has been accepted.
To address the policy concern that agencies are provided too much power in
using SEPs to direct resources to pet projects that might be connected to political
goals,145 SEP ideas could be generated outside the agency’s and violator’s negotia-
tions. State use of SEP libraries, like Idea Banks, provide one mechanism to detach
the selection of SEPs from the EPA’s discretion.146 Creating a public website that
allows for the submission of ideas by the public, that also allows voting and com-
mentary on submissions would connect the will of the public with the selection of
SEPs, without the stagnant pace of legislation. A requirement that the source of
ideas be connected to the community wherein the violation occurred would help
alleviate the concern that a federal agency’s knowledge of the needs of the local
citizenry is insufficient to control resource allocation without aid of the legislature.
139. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1226 (4th Cir. 1981) (è[T]he power to
spend—constitutionally reserved to the Congress—may be delegated to others.æ).
140. Bonorris et al., supra note 32, at 215.
141. Dingell, supra note 49.
142. Elizabeth Rybicki, Veto Override Procedure in the House and Senate, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, (Mar. 26, 2019) https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/2b1325dc-6a6b-42c4-9a08-
506c3a59a251.pdf (èA vetoed bill can become law if two -thirds of the Members voting in each chamber
agree, by recorded vote, a quorum being present, to repass the bill and thereby override the veto of the
President.æ).
143. Clark, supra note 90, at 8.
144. Party Division, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm; Majority
Changes in the House of Representatives, 1856 to Present, HISTORY, ART&ARCHIVES, UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Majority-Changes/Majority-
Changes/.
145. See supra section II C.
146. See supra section II C.
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V. CONCLUSION
Environmental disputes that arise from violation of federal environmental laws
are complex and it is difficult to achieve adequate resolution in federal courts. Ne-
gotiated settlements have been the preferred method of the EPA and DOJ for reso-
lution in enforcement actions against violators of federal laws. To facilitate nego-
tiation and improve outcomes for all who are affected, SEPs were developed as a
negotiation tool well suited to address the unique problems presented by environ-
mental harm. While there are legitimate legal and policy concerns regarding their
use, the underlying problems that spurred SEP development are still present and are
increasing in prevalence.
Rather than allow a situation to persist where administrations eliminate and
restore the tool and do harm to the negotiation of settlement in civil enforcement
actions in the process, changes should be made to address the concerns. It is just as
likely that the next administration will again prohibit SEPs as it is that SEP use will
remain untouched for decades. A long-term solution in the form of federal statutory
changes or state solutions should be pursued to provide greater certainty.
16
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2021, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2021/iss2/11
